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FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF PATENT CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION AND WHY THE ISSUE IS MOOT IN PRACTICE 
 
Benjamin M. Cappel 
This article addresses the appellate standard of review of patent claim constructions. 
Specifically, this article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should end the Federal Circuit’s de 
novo review of claim constructions, but that any new standard should have little, if any, effect on 
Federal Circuit practice. First, the article provides a background on patent claim construction and 
discusses why it is a critical step in patent litigations. Section two provides an introduction to the 
Supreme Court’s Markman decision – the foremost judicial authority on claim construction – as 
well as the Federal Circuit’s application of Markman in determining the appellate standard of 
review in its Cybor decision. Section three puts forth several arguments opposing the Federal 
Circuit’s use of de novo review. Section four provides a rebuttal to section three, but ultimately 
concludes that the Supreme Court should reverse Cybor as it improperly conflicts with Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). And the final section suggests that even if Cybor was an erroneous decision, it was 
a harmless one because the “informal deference” that the Federal Circuit currently applies during 
de novo review of the factual issues in question here is substantially similar to the standard required 
by Rule 52 - essentially rendering this a purely academic question. In conclusion, the U.S. Supreme 
Court should reverse Cybor because it fails to comport with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52; but going forward, 
the Federal Circuit should not risk developing a complex new standard and should merely try and 
turn its current practice of informal deference into one of formal deference.  
I. Introduction to Patent Claim Construction 
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 The drafters of the U.S. Constitution expressly provided a system for Congress to promote 
innovation by giving inventors a limited monopoly on their respective inventions.1 Congress used 
this power to issue “U.S. Letters Patent” to qualifying inventors.2 Today, Congress delegates this 
power to United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), who may grant patent protection 
to a qualifying inventor who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”3 In exchange 
for a detailed disclosure of the invention to the public, the inventor is granted “the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented invention” for a 
certain term of years.4 
 The patent system is, at its root, an attempt to balance two competing interests: to “secure 
to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is still open to 
them.”5 In other words, the patent system seeks to provide an incentive to innovate, in exchange 
for the subsequent disclosure of the invention to the public. The interests of incentive and public 
notice are promoted through the patent’s claims and specifications, respectively. The invention is 
disclosed to the public through the specifications, which act as a blueprint of the invention. The 
specifications are written in a manner, which would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to 
reproduce the invention.6 In exchange for the disclosure of the invention in the specifications, the 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries”). 
2 See Ramon A. Klitzke, History of Patents-U.S., in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION 
MANAGEMENT 394, 398 (Robert Calvert ed., 1964) (giving a background on the development of patent practice). 
3 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
4 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 373; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (listing actions that would 
constitute direct infringement). 
5 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 373. 
6 See Markman at 373; See also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (specification must describe the invention “in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art…to make and use the same”). 
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patentee is granted protection within the scope of the “claims,” which “particularly point out and 
distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”7 
 The granting of a patent gives the patentee the right to exclude others who “infringe” on 
the patent.8 An act of infringement occurs when an unauthorized party makes, uses, sells, or offers 
for sale a product that falls within the scope of the patent’s protections, i.e., within the claims.9 In 
addition to excluding products that fall within the literal language of the claims, patent protection 
extends to a gray area of sorts, excluding products that are deemed to be “equivalent.”10 Under 
both theories of infringement, the process of defining claim terms is crucial, as they necessarily 
determine the scope of the patentee’s rights. 
 A patentee who believes that his patent is being infringed will often bring litigation against 
the accused infringer because he may obtain an injunction and/or damages against the accused. 
The patentee will ultimately be successful if he can successfully show that a patented claim “covers 
the alleged infringer’s product or process, which in turn necessitates a determination of what the 
words in the claim means.”11 First, the court interprets the claims to determine the scope of the 
patentee’s protection through a process known as claim construction.12 Second, the jury, or judge 
sitting as fact-finder, determines whether the accused infringer’s actions constitute infringement, 
given the judge’s findings during claim construction.13 
                                                 
7 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
8 Id. 
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
10 See Markman at 373 (patent protection extends to “products that go to the heart of an invention but avoi[d] the 
literal language of the claim by making a noncritical change”). 
11 Markman at 373; note that for the sake of clarity in this article, I will assume that all patents are valid, and that the 
only issue is that of infringement. 
12 See Id. 
13 See Id. 
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 Patent claim construction is often viewed as the most critical step in patent litigations 
because it often determines whether or not the accused infringer was actually infringing.14 In fact, 
in many cases, a judge’s claim construction will result in either settlement or summary judgment.15 
Furthermore, the importance of claim construction extends past the instant litigation, because it 
puts the public on notice of what information can be freely used, and what information is subject 
to a patentee’s exclusive monopoly.16 
 Although there is no statutory framework for a judge to follow while conducting claim 
construction, the process is generally the same in all courts. The uniformity in claim constructions 
is largely due to the framework set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Phillips 
v. AWH Corp.17 As a basic principal for interpreting a patent claim term, the judge should maintain 
the “ordinary and customary” meaning of the terms whenever possible.18 Unlike similar instances 
of judicial interpretation (e.x., contract interpretation), the proper interpretation is not the “ordinary 
and customary” meaning that and ordinary person would attribute to the term. On the contrary, the 
proper interpretation is the meaning that would be attributed to the term by a person of ordinary 
skill in the art at the time of the invention.19 This standard applies because patents are written for 
their foreseeable readers - a person of skill in the respective art, not the average person.20 
 
                                                 
14 See Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of Review in Patent Claim Construction, in AIPLA QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL, (Spring, 2012) (giving a background on patent claim construction).  
15 See Id. (discussing how the issue of claim construction is often determinative of a patent litigation).  
16 See Markman at 373 (addressing the public interest function of patents). 
17 415 F.3d 1303, 1335. 
18 See Phillips at 1312 (discussing how patent claim construction is similar to contract interpretation); see also 
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that claim terms “are generally given 
their ordinary and customary meaning”). 
19 See Phillips at 1313 (discussing what a claim term’s “ordinary and customary” meaning is). 
20 See Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119 Fed. Cir. 2002) (patents are “a concise statement for 
persons in the field”). 
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 During claim construction, the court should first look to the intrinsic evidence of record, 
i.e., “the patent itself including the claims, the specifications and, if in evidence, the patent 
prosecution history.”21 After looking to contested term itself, the court should first look to the 
surrounding words in the same claim.22 The Court may also find guidance in other claims of the 
same patent because the meaning of a term is often consistent between terms. As such, identifying 
the similarities and differences between two claims may be helpful.23 For instance, it can properly 
be inferred that an independent claim does not have a particular limitation if there is a 
corresponding dependent claim that expressly adds that limitation. 
 Additionally, the Court will review the patent’s specifications, as terms are “to be construed 
in the light of the specifications.”24 The specifications are particularly useful because, unlike the 
claims themselves, the specifications are statutorily required to describe the claimed invention in 
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms.”25 And the USPTO requires that the meaning of claim terms 
be ascertainable through those clearly written specifications.26 Furthermore, the specifications are 
helpful because patent drafters often give express definitions to claim terms through the 
specifications. Therefore, the specifications are treated as a dictionary of sorts because they have 
the ability to give terms new meaning, whether it be through express definition or by implication.27 
Since the specifications are written in a manner that is necessarily clear enough to enable a person 
                                                 
21 Phillips at 1313. 
22 See Philips at 1314; see also ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the context 
of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning 
of those terms”). 
23 See Id.  
24 United States v. Adams, 86 S.Ct. 708, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966). 
25 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
26 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1) (requiring that patent claims must “find clear support or antecedent basis in the 
description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference…”). 
27 Phillips at 1316. 
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of ordinary skill in the art, they are often sufficient to develop a proper construction for a disputed 
term.28  
 The court may also look to the prosecution history of the patent, if it is in evidence.29 The 
prosecution history of a patent may be useful during claim construction because it is a written 
record documenting the communication with the patent office that resulted in the patent’s 
issuance.30 But the prosecution history should not be given as much weight as the document 
itself.31  In most situations, reliance on extrinsic evidence is unnecessary because the claims, 
specifications, and prosecution history will be sufficient to resolve any ambiguity in the claim 
terms.32 
 However, extrinsic evidence is often permissible because the intrinsic record may be 
insufficient to give a proper construction, and it may assist judges in understanding complex 
technologies. 33  Extrinsic evidence includes all evidence other than the patent itself and its 
prosecution history, “including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned 
treatises.” 34  The use of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation is common because patent 
documents are written by and for persons of “ordinary skill in the art,” not for judges.35 And in 
many cases, the person of “ordinary skill” in the particular field is in fact quite extraordinary. For 
example, if one of NASA’s patents was in litigation, the person of ordinary skill in the art would 
likely be a rocket scientist with multiple PhDs. Because the judge in that case would have to 
interpret a claim term as a rocket scientist would, an expert’s guidance would be useful to assist 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 980. 
30 See Id. at 1317. 
31 See Id. (noting that the prosecution history should be given less weight than the patent itself as it outlines the 
negotiations leading to the final product, rather than the final product itself).  
32 See Id.  
33 See Phillips at 1317 (discussing when extrinsic evidence may be introduced during claim construction). 
34 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 546, 20 L.Ed. 33 (1870). 
35 Phillips. at 1318. 
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that judges in thinking like a rocket scientist. As Judge Newman has noted in support of the use of 
extrinsic evidence during claim construction, “[j]udges not only need a larger understanding of the 
science or technology, but we also need help with understanding how the particular terms as used 
in the patent are viewed by persons in the field of the invention.”36 Therefore, extrinsic evidence 
is often proper, if not necessary, for a judge to develop an accurate claim construction. 
 One of the most common forms of extrinsic evidence is expert testimony. Expert testimony 
can be useful in many situations, such as to “provide background on the technology at issue, to 
explain how an invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects 
of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular 
term in the parent or the prior art has a particular meaning the pertinent field.”37 Although extrinsic 
evidence is often used to assist judges in understanding the technology in question, judges should 
be cautious when adopting an extrinsic source’s definition of a given claim term because it may 
conflict with the patentee’s intent. Also, there is concern of expert bias, because experts are often 
highly paid by their respective parties. As such, each party may only put forth the extrinsic 
evidence most favorable to them, even if only marginally relevant, leaving the the district judge 
with difficult credibility determinations as to these witnesses.38 Although there are substantial risks 
associated with extrinsic evidence, it is properly used to assist the court in a variety of issues, and 
is often relied upon during claim constructions. 
The US Supreme Court’s Murky Guidance on Patent Claim Construction and The 
Federal Circuit’s Subsequent Interpretation and Application of De Novo Review. 
                                                 
36 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
37 Phillips at 1318. 
38 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) 
(discussing how “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in 
evaluating it”). 
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Although the Supreme Court has not made a determination on the proper standard of review 
for claim construction on appeal, the Court gave guidance on claim construction in Markman, 
which the Federal Circuit later interpreted to conclude that claim construction is properly reviewed 
de novo. The Markman Court held that claim construction is an issue for a judge, not jury.39 This 
holding was subsequently interpreted by the Federal Circuit in Cybor, that held that claim 
construction is a matter of law subject to de novo review – i.e., the Federal Circuit does not need 
to give any deference to a district judge’s opinion.40 But it has been shown that the Federal 
Circuit’s practice of de novo review does lend deference to a district judge’s findings, and that this 
deference has likely increased in recent years. 41  Therefore, although claim construction is 
technically reviewed de novo, the Federal Circuit’s application of de novo review gives at least 
some deference to the district judge’s findings. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Markman Decision 
Although the Supreme Court’s Markman decision did not answer the question of what standard 
of review applies to claim construction, the Markman decision is crucial to this analysis because 
the Court gave significant guidance on the nature of claim construction itself.42 The question 
presented to the Markman Court was whether “the interpretation of a so-called patent claim…is a 
matter of law reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a 
jury will determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is 
                                                 
39 See Markman 570 US at 373 (holding that “[t]he construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, 
is exclusively within the province of the court”). 
40 See Cybor Corporation v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that the issue of 
patent claim construction is properly reviewed de novo on appeal). 
41 See Cybor at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) (“common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight” 
given “the care…with which that view was developed, and the information on which it is based”); See also J. Jonas 
Anderson, Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim 
Construction, 108 NORTHWESTERN. UNIV. LAW. REV. 1, 35 (2013) (discussing the increase in the Federal Circuit’s 
deference to District Courts after Phillips v. AWH). 
42 See Markman v. Westview Instruments 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). 
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offered.”43 After finding that claim construction was not subject to the Seventh Amendment’s 
guarantee of a jury trial, the Court ultimately held that “[t]he construction of a patent, including 
terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”44  
In Markman, the patent at issue was an “Inventory Control and Reporting System for 
Drycleaning Stores.”45  The proper construction of one claim term, “inventory” was disputed 
during the litigation. After hearing several days of testimony from several expert witnesses, the 
jury determined the proper scope of the claim term.46 But the district judge disagreed with the jury 
and used a different claim construction.47  
The losing party appealed the case to the Federal Circuit and subsequently the U.S. Supreme 
Court, arguing that the judge had improperly decided the issue of claim construction. Although the 
jury did make a determination on the proper claim construction, the Judge decided to use his own, 
rather than the jury’s.48 Therefore, appellants argued that the Seventh Amendment reserves some 
determinations – including claim construction - for a jury, and therefore the use of the judge’s 
construction deprived appellant of the right to trial by jury.49  
As this was a Seventh Amendment case, the Court’s analysis began with an attempt to tie claim 
construction to a similar issue at common law.50 But the Court found that claim construction 
hearings were a modern practice, and therefore, the Seventh Amendment did not apply.51 After 
determining that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to claim construction, the Court found 
                                                 
43 Id. at 373. 
44 Id. at 373 (emphasis added) (note however, the holding of “exclusively within the province of the court” is not 
identical to the question presented, whether claim construction is a “matter of law”). 
45 Markman at 370. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F.Supp. 1535, 1537-38 (E.D.Pa. 1991). 
49 Markman at 377. 
50 Markman at 381. 
51 Id. 
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that “functional considerations” would decide whether a judge or jury would be best at claim 
construction.52  
The Court first noted that claim construction is a “mongrel practice,” “falling somewhere 
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.”53 And for such mixed issues, it is 
best for either the judge or the jury to decide all matters, rather than divide the two.54 Because 
claim construction is a complex, “mongrel practice,” the training and common interpretation of 
written documents by judges make them better suited than a lay juror for providing an accurate 
claim construction.55 Also, the Court emphasized “the importance of uniformity in the treatment 
of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court.”56 
Uniformity, the Court argued, is essential for the policy consideration of giving public notice.57 
Therefore, the Court ultimately held that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art within 
its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”58 
Thus, three considerations from Markman will be integral to an analysis of the proper standard 
of review of claim constructions: (1) the training and common practice of interpreting written 
documents by judges make them, not juries, best at providing an accurate claim construction; (2) 
because judges have similar training, the construction given by a court will be more uniform and 
predictable than a jury; (3) because allocating the issue to the court will promote uniformity and 
accuracy in claim construction, such an approach will provide notice to the public on the scope of 
                                                 
52 Id. at 390. 
53 Id. at 390. 
54 See Markman at 390 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114, 106 S.Ct. (1985) (noting that “as a matter of the 
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question”). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 370 (emphasis added); although this can easily be misconstrued as meaning that the issue is purely a matter 
of law, the Court’s holding was only that the issue is a matter for the judge - as with many issues in patent 
litigations, the judge may sit as both trier of fact and law. 
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the patentee’s monopoly and, by the same token, what they are free to use without fear of 
infringement. 
B. Cybor and The Federal Circuit’s Adoption of De Novo Review 
The Federal Circuit determined that claim construction is properly reviewed de novo on 
appeal because claim construction requires a judge to make legal determinations and de novo 
review is consistent with Markman. Although the Markman court was explicit in holding that claim 
construction was a task solely for the court, it failed to address the proper standard of review on 
appeal. But the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the proper standard of review is 
de novo in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.59 Although this decision was questioned on 
multiple occasions, it has never been reversed and was most recently upheld in Lighting Ballast 
Control LLC v. Philips Electronics N.A. Corp.60  
After Markman, there was no direction on the proper standard of review of claim 
constructions until the Federal Circuit’s Cybor decision that held that claim construction is 
properly reviewed de novo on appeal.61  This conclusion stemmed from the Federal Circuit’s 
adoption of an interpretation of Markman that suggests that claim construction is purely a matter 
of law.62 In other words, the Federal Circuit read Markman’s holding that claim construction is 
“exclusively within the province of the court” as meaning that the issue is “purely a matter of law.” 
If this reasoning is accurate, and claim construction is purely a matter of law, then claim 
construction is properly reviewable de novo.63  
                                                 
59 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
60 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (En banc). 
61 See Cybor 138 F.3d 1448, 1461. 
62 Id. 
63 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (holding that judicial 
decisions on questions of law are reviewable de novo).  
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After determining that claim construction is a factual determination, reviewable de novo, 
the Cybor court looked to practical considerations to determine whether it should review these 
issues de novo.64 The Federal Circuit found that de novo review was proper because it furthered 
the policy considerations of accuracy and uniformity in the construction of patent claims – 
considerations that were explicitly endorsed by the Markman Court.65  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit ultimately held that it reviews “claim construction de novo on appeal including any 
allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”66  
However, many judges and academics criticized the Cybor decision, alleging that 
underlying factual determinations are improper for de novo review. For example, Judges Mayer 
and Newman, have stated that “[w]hile this court may persist in the delusion that claim 
construction is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts…a claim should be 
interpreted from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art and in view of the state of the 
art at the time of invention…These questions, which are critical to the correct interpretation of a 
claim, are inherently factual.”67  
Nevertheless, Cybor has remained good law since the decision and, most recently, the Federal 
Circuit upheld Cybor in its Lighting Ballast decision.68 In coming to its holding, the Court noted 
that: (1) that the application of de novo review has proven to be workable over the past 15 years, 
and; (2) that there does not appear to be any functional alternative standard to de novo review.69 
                                                 
64 See Cybor at 1456 (discussing the considerations of uniformity and accuracy in determining the standard of 
review of claim constructions).  
65 See Id. 
66 Cybor at 1461 (emphasis added); note that, in terms of the analytical framework set forth in Section I, supra, all 
steps of claim construction, from the plain meaning of the terms to the review of expert witnesses, are to be 
reviewed de novo. 
67 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1301, 1330 (Mayer, dissenting) (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
68 See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics N.A. Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2014) (En banc) (Upholding 
Cybor’s adoption of de novo review).  
69 Id. 
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But this opinion was accompanied by a strong dissent and its reasoning has been questioned by 
even the Supreme Court. Therefore, after years of confusion, the Supreme Court has decided to 
settle this matter in Teva v. Sandoz.70 
C. How Has De Novo Review Been Applied? 
The Federal Circuit’s application of de novo review to claim construction may be more 
deferential than required because the Court is aware that a district judge is in a better position to 
make many critical determinations. By definition, de novo review allows for an issue to be 
reviewed “[a]new; afresh; a second time,” making it the strictest standard of review.71 De novo 
review is “the long-recognized appellate review standard for issues of law in the trial proceeding, 
regardless of whether the case was tried to a judge of a jury.”72 During de novo review, the Federal 
Circuit may draw its own conclusions on the issue at hand, lending no deference to the district 
court.73 In theory, the Federal Circuit may decide the issue as if the district judge had never heard 
it.74  Naturally then, those who have obtained an adverse decision prefer to have the matter 
reviewed de novo. 
In practice however, the Federal Circuit may give more deference than required because 
completely ignoring a district judge’s findings would be irrational. Imagine for a moment that you 
have been appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Your first case is a claim 
construction appeal and are presented with three sources – a transcript of both sides’ expert 
testimony, and the district judge’s opinion. Knowing that the transcripts will be hundreds of pages 
long, and will most likely be somewhat biased, you naturally first reach for the district judge’s 
                                                 
70 See Teva v. Sandoz (U.S. 2014). 
71APPEAL DE NOVO, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
72 Pall Corp v. Micron Separations 66 F.3d 1211, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
73 See D. Gopenko, Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of Review in Patent Claim Construction, AIPLA 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL (Spring, 2012) (discussing Fed. Circuit’s practice of de novo review). 
74 Id. 
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opinion. Even though you have been told that you don’t need to follow the district court’s opinion, 
it seems rational to give some, if not the most weight to the district judge’s opinion. Regardless of 
whether or not the district judge’s claim construction is adopted, it would simply be irrational to 
reject the district judge’s analysis without any consideration. 
 In practice too, especially in claim construction, it has been shown that appellate judges do 
in fact lend at least some deference to the district court’s opinion.75 For example, the Federal 
Circuit has noted that during the course of a de novo review, “we do not start from scratch; rather 
we begin with and carefully consider the trial court’s work.”76 Even if the court doesn’t refer to its 
reliance specifically as “deference,” appellate courts are nonetheless presented with the opinion of 
the district judge, whom they are aware has spent more time with the case and with the witnesses 
and parties.77 Thus, the Federal Circuit has stated that:  
 [T]he use of the term de novo to describe our appellate function is a misnomer. As 
our sister circuit noted: ‘To consider a matter de novo is to determine it anew, as if it had 
not been heard before and no decision had been rendered.’ By use of the term de novo, this 
court means that it does not defer to the ‘lower court ruling or agency decision in question.’ 
 
As such, appellate judges give, if not deference, at least some consideration to the district 
judge’s opinion, especially if the opinion contains sound reasoning.78  
                                                 
75 See J. Jonas Anderson, Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of 
Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (asserting that the Federal Circuit gives “informal 
deference” to district judges, making the threat of de novo review much lower than many believe). 
76 Key Pharms. V. Hercon Labs. Corp. 161 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
77 See Cybor at 1462-63 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s practice of de novo review): 
 
 Though we review the record de novo, meaning without applying a formal deferential standard of review,  
 common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view [on an issue of law such as claim interpretation] will 
carry  weight. That weight may vary depending on the care, as shown in the record, with which that view was  
 developed, and the information on which it is based. 
 
Id. at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring); see also, Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[R]eviewing courts often 
acknowledge that as to particular legal issues lower tribunals have special competence and their judgments on those 
legal issues should be accorded significant weight”). 
78 Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1556 n.1, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 13: 1324 n. I (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1367 n.5 (9th 1993)). 
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Furthermore, it is likely that the amount of deference being attributed to district courts is 
greater than any of the above suggests. As seen in the preceding paragraphs, a district judge will 
always be given at least some deference, while the most deference will be given when the district 
court’s opinion was well reasoned. But as mentioned above, a detailed framework for claim 
construction analysis was not available for district judges to follow until 2005.79 As such, the 
Federal Circuit was giving deference to district courts even at a time when each court was 
essentially making up its own methods for claim construction.  And as statistical methods have 
shown, in the years following Phillips, district judges adopted the same analytical framework, 
which has resulted in a dramatic reduction of reversals on appeal.80 
To summarize the process then, the Federal Circuit’s practice of de novo review of claim 
construction involves first an in-depth review of a district judge’s opinion, whereupon they are 
free to keep or reject the opinion as they see fit. Although de novo review is, from a purely 
academic standpoint, devoid of any deference to the district court’s findings, the Federal Circuit 
has historically stated that it does not adhere strictly to the standard. And since the adoption of the 
Phillips framework, the number of reversals of claim constructions on appeal has dropped 
drastically, suggesting a further increase in deference. And therefore, the Federal Circuit’s 
application of de novo review is largely deferential to a district court’s well reasoned opinion. 
III. Arguments in Favor of Rejecting De Novo Review 
 De novo review may be improper for some findings during claim construction because 
those findings may invoke Federal Rule 52. Rule 52 requires that a district judge’s factual 
                                                 
79 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Section I, supra at 4-7 (discussing the Phillips 
framework for patent claim construction). 
80 See J. Jonas Anderson, Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of 
Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (finding that there has been a reduction in reversals of 
claim construction on appeal, largely due to the adoption of the Phillips framework by district courts). 
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determinations be reversed only for clear error.81 And because de novo review, by nature, discards 
a district court’s opinion, an issue that invokes Rule 52 cannot properly be reviewed de novo. As 
explained above, claim construction often requires extrinsic evidence that yields subsidiary factual 
determinations, such as credibility of expert witnesses. Therefore, such subsidiary determinations 
likely invoke Rule 52, rendering de novo review improper. This reasoning is compelling, and most 
likely requires that subsidiary factual determinations be reviewed in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 52. Therefore, the Supreme Court should require that such subsidiary factual issues be reversed 
only where clearly erroneous. However, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s actual practice of 
de novo review is much different than FRCP 52’s “clearly erroneous” standard.  
District Judges’ Findings of Fact May Only be Reversed Where Clearly Erroneous. 
Appellate courts are required to give deference to a district judge’s factual determinations 
because the district courts are in the best position to make such findings. Rule 52 applies to issues 
that are tried to the bench, such as claim construction.82 Under Rule 52, a district judge’s findings 
of fact “are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”83 The Supreme Court has found that a 
finding is clearly erroneous, as per Rule 52 when “although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed.”84 Furthermore, “[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible 
in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though 
                                                 
81 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) reads: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the 
witnesses’ credibility.” 
82 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also, Markman at 373 (giving the issue of claim construction exclusively to the 
court). 
83 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). 
84 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 
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convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 
differently.”85  
The Court has also noted that the “clearly erroneous” standard of Rule 52(a) is particularly 
relevant to district court findings based upon the credibility of witnesses.86 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 exists 
because district courts, not appellate courts are best prepared to make factual determinations.87 
The Federal Circuit has stated that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to weigh evidence that 
involves credibility determinations, and that such determinations should be accorded substantial 
deference on appellate review.”88 This is because the trier of fact – who is present for witness 
testimony – is able to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses.89  
This makes good sense because we would prefer that deference be given to the judge that was 
physically present for testimony over the judge who is merely given a transcript. In viewing expert 
testimony from a district judge’s perspective, the district judge is physically present to hear and 
analyze the credibility of the testimony as well as the witnesses him or herself.90 In contrast, an 
appellate judge may only be provided with a transcript of the witness’s testimony.91 This puts the 
appellate judge at a great disadvantage when making a credibility determination on witnesses and 
their testimony.  
Furthermore, the Court has urged that Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 be treated as a broad, “blanket” statute. 
The Supreme Court has noted that Rule 52 “does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain 
categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s 
                                                 
85 Id.  
86 Id. (discussing the underlying purpose of Rule 52, given its legislative history). 
87 Id. 
88 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.2d 1113, 1122, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1772 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
89 Id. 
90 See Id. 
91 See Id. 
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findings unless clearly erroneous.”92 As such, the “review of factual findings under the clearly-
erroneous standard – with its deference to the trier of fact – is the rule, not the exception.”93 The 
rules drafters have also spoken as to the breadth of Rule 52, noting that the Rule is a “broad, blanket 
provision” – absent of any exceptions.94 Between the intent of the drafters, and Supreme Court 
guidance, it would appear that issues of claim construction are no different than other issues and 
are subject to the rule if they require the judge to make factual determinations. 
 To summarize, Rule 52(a) requires that the appellate court affirm a district court’s findings 
of fact, regardless of whether they would have come to a different conclusion. Only in situations 
where the district judge’s findings are found to be “clearly erroneous” is an appellate court properly 
in the position to disturb a district court’s factual findings. Therefore, applying de novo review to 
an issue that invokes Rule 52 would be improper.  
B. Claim Construction May Require Underlying Factual Determinations That  
  Invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. 
One question that the Markman Court failed to answer was whether claim construction is 
purely a legal issue, purely a factual issue, or is a mixed issue of law and fact. But the Court did 
note that claim construction is a “mongrel practice,” and is “somewhere between a pristine legal 
standard and a simple historical fact.”95 Similarly, Federal Circuit judges have found that any 
“delusion that claim construction is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying 
facts…is plainly not the case.”96 Judge Mayer was ultimately of the opinion that the Federal Circuit 
                                                 
92 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 
93 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 
94 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (1985 amendments); but see, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 466 
U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984) (finding that there is a narrow exception to Rule 52 where the Court is asked to resolve a 
conflict between constitutional provisions). 
95 Markman at 1390. 
96 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1301, 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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is “obligated by Rule 52(a) to review the factual findings of the district court that underlie the 
determination of claim construction for clear error.”97 
As shown in the preceding sections, claim construction often requires that a judge look to 
extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony in developing a proper claim construction. Although 
the ultimate determination is a legal one, the credibility determinations that are made during this 
process may properly be classified as factual determinations that invoke Rule 52. As an illustration, 
examine the following inference chains:  
1. Chain 1: 
• Patent claims term “X”;  
•  Specifications define “X” as inclusive of “Y”; 
• Therefore, “X” includes “Y.” 
 
2. Chain 2: 
• Patent claims term “X”; 
• One expert witness testifies that “X” includes “Y”; 
•  A second expert testifies that “X” does not include “Y”; 
• Judge finds the first expert to be more credible; 
• Therefore, “X” includes “Y” 
 
In both cases, the judge’s ultimate determination that “‘X’ includes ‘Y’” is a question of law, 
subject to de novo review. Where the cases differ however, is how the judge reached that 
conclusion. In the first example, the judge is not looking outside the patent’s intrinsic record and  
his determination was therefore a purely legal one. In contrast, the judge in the second example 
was unable to develop a proper claim construction through the intrinsic record and was forced to 
rely on extrinsic evidence – namely, expert witness testimony. Surely expert testimony was set 
forth by both parties, meaning that at some point the judge was required to make a determination 
to rely on one expert’s testimony over the other. These situations, where a judge sits in a position 
                                                 
97 Id. 
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of making credibility determinations, is when a judge makes factual determinations that may be 
subject to Rule 52.  
 As shown above, claim construction is often a mixed question of law and fact. Although 
the ultimate determination is a legal one, a judge will often need to make underlying factual 
determinations in the process. In situations like the above hypothetical, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 will 
most likely apply because of the broad scope attributed to the rule. In fact, this appears to be exactly 
the situation that the drafters imagined – where a district judge was physically present to listen to 
witness testimony. Therefore, review of such subsidiary factual determinations may at times 
invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, making de novo review improper. 
IV. Arguments in Favor of Maintaining De Novo Review 
 Proponents of de novo review argue that claim construction is a matter properly reviewed 
de novo because it furthers several policy considerations that have been endorsed by the Supreme 
Court. Proponents of de novo review first argue that de novo review is permissible because the 
issue is purely legal under Markman. Second, it is argued that de novo review promotes uniformity 
– as endorsed in Markman. And even if de novo review is not proper, no adequate alternative has 
been presented to replace it. But as noted above, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 is a broad “blanket” provision 
that probably encompasses claim construction. Therefore, the arguments in favor of maintaining 
review are probably not enough to overcome the breadth of Rule 52. 
A. De Novo Review is Arguably Permissible Under Markman 
Proponents of de novo review argue that such a standard of review is permissible by Markman. 
Markman ultimately held that issues of claim construction are “exclusively within the province of 
the court.”98 Proponents of de novo review believe that the scope of Markman's  holding expands 
                                                 
98 Markman at 373 
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beyond its plain meaning, and should be construed as holding that claim construction is not only 
a question for the judge, but is also a question of law – making it reviewable de novo.99 And as the 
Supreme Court has noted, a district court’s “[d]ecisions of questions of law are reviewable de 
novo.”100 
Even if claim construction is not purely an issue of fact, proponents of de novo review 
argue that Markman suggests that a judge’s factual determinations should nonetheless be treated 
as legal. In other words, it is suggested that claim construction is a “special issue” that should fall 
within an exception to Rule 52 for the sake of judicial efficiency. This reasoning largely relies on 
the Markman court’s reliance on Miller v. Fenton.101 In Miller the Court held that the admisibility 
of a confession should be treated “as a legal inquiry requiring plenary federal review.”102 Like 
Markman, the Miller Court looked to functional considerations in determining that one judicial 
actor should decide the mixed issue at hand because of functional considerations.103 However, the 
Miller Court extended the treatment of that particular Constitutional issue as a matter for the court, 
as being treated as a matter of law reviewable de novo on appeal.104 But Miller appears to be 
limited to the issue of confession admissibility, and does not suggest that all mixed questions 
should be treated as purely legal. Furthermore, as stated in the previous section, there is a narrow 
exception to Rule 52 for certain Constitutional matters. Although the Miller court didn’t expressly 
invoke the exception, it is possible that the Court implicitly relied on this narrow Constitutional 
exception to avoid Rule 52.  
                                                 
99 See e.x., Lighting Ballast (Fed. Cir. 2014) (En banc). 
100 Highmark v. Allcare Health Management System, 134 S.Ct. at 1748. 
101 474 U.S. 104, 114, 106 S.Ct. 445, 451, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). 
102 Id. 
103 Miller v. Fenton 106, 155 S.Ct. 445 (1985). 
104 Id. 
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And as shown above, the history of Rule 52 suggests that the Rule has a broad scope and that 
exceptions should be avoided if at all possible. And the factual determinations in Markman 
hearings often revolve around determinations of expert witness credibility - precisely the situation 
contemplated by Rule 52. As such, it is unlikely that an appellate board would be in as good a 
position as the district judge - which was not the case in Miller. Therefore, although some mixed 
issues may be treated as purely law or fact on appeal, those seem to fall into a small class of 
exceptions that are unlikely to apply to claim constructions. 
De Novo Review Promotes Uniformity 
Proponents of de novo review also argue that it is the proper method of review because it 
promotes uniformity in the claim construction of a given patent. This is a reasonable argument, as 
the Court’s interest in promoting uniformity was expressly endorsed by the Markman Court.105 In 
addition to Markman’s endorsement of uniformity, Congress believed that promoting uniformity 
was important enough to create the Federal Circuit.106 The uniformity argument suggests that we 
should foreclose the possibility that a patent claim term have a different construction depending 
on the jurisdiction.107  
The following example is useful in illustrating this concern. Imagine company BigPharma 
develops an “injection” that cures cancer, which they call “ChaChing.” BigPharma patents 
ChaChing to ensure that they are the exclusive seller of the drug. Wanting a piece of the profits, 
two generic companies, Gen-A and Gen-B file applications to develop generic versions of 
ChaChing. In turn, BigPharma sues both companies for infringement - Gen-A in the District of 
                                                 
105 See Markman at 380 (discussing the importance of promoting uniformity in furthering the public notice function 
of the patent system). 
106 Id. at 390. 
107 See Lighting Ballast (Fed. Cir. 2014) (En banc) (upholding de novo review in part for the sake of promoting 
intrajurisdictional uniformity in claim construction). 
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New Jersey, and Gen-B in the District of California. During claim construction, the New Jersey 
court finds that the patent’s use of the term “injection” includes all methods of injection. On the 
other hand, the California court finds that “injection” includes only intravenous injections. As such, 
Gen-B’s intramuscular injection is not infringing. But Gen-A’s identical method of injection would 
be infringing in California.    
Imagine now that both cases are appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit 
determines that, had it been the district judge, it would have found “injection” to include all 
injections. However, it concedes that the California court did make a rational decision that other 
courts may have agreed with. As such, both claim constructions would be upheld under a “clearly 
erroneous” standard of review. In that situation, there is the concern that the court has just 
undermined the patent system’s goal of providing notice to the public – how is the public put on 
notice of the scope of the information in the public domain, if it is different in each jurisdiction? 
By the same token, how does this affect an innovator’s incentive to create new products given the 
uncertainty in the scope of protection provided by their patents? 
This concern is arguably removed through the application of de novo review. Under de novo 
review, the Federal Circuit would have the ability to choose one construction over the other, even 
though a rational judge could have made either construction. As such, the public would know 
exactly what is in the public domain, and what is covered by the patentee’s exclusive monopoly. 
Also, patentees will have confidence in that their patents will be held to the same standard in all 
jurisdictions, thus arguably promoting innovation. 
Although uniformity is a legitimate consideration, and de novo review would appear to 
promote it in some circumstances, it is not clear that this is enough of a reason to maintain de novo 
review. First, the hypothetical above is extremely rare – in fact, when asked by the Court, the 
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appellants in Teva v. Sandoz failed to point to a single case where the outcome of an appeal would 
have been different under the clearly erroneous standard. Furthermore, the informal deference 
given to district courts during de novo review will make it even less likely that there be any 
difference on appeal. If the above hypothetical was commonplace in litigation, then perhaps it 
would warrant an exception to the rule. But absent that, de novo review does not lead to different 
results than the clearly erroneous standard, and therefore has little to no effect on uniformity. 
Because there is such a slight effect on uniformity, it is probably not sufficient to outweigh the 
issue that de novo review conflicts with Rule 52.  
There May Not Be an Adequate Alternative to De Novo Review 
Even if Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 does require that underlying findings of fact be reviewed for clear 
error, it is not clear that there is a practical way of separating issues of law and fact. In mixed 
questions of law and fact, such as claim construction, there must be a way to separate questions of 
law from questions of fact, if both rules are to be satisfied. However, it is argued that changing the 
standard of review for such a “mongrel” issue will only create a larger practical issue in deciding 
which findings are legal and which are factual.  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the “vexing nature” of this issue, noting that there is no 
“rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.”108 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted in its Lighting Ballast decision that one of the main reasons 
for upholding Cybor and de novo review was that none of the parties in favor of rejecting de novo 
review could put forth a workable test to determine when de novo review would apply and when 
Rule 52 would apply.109 In contrast, the Federal Circuit’s practice of de novo review makes the 
                                                 
108 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). 
109 See Lighting Ballast (Fed. Cir. 2014) (En banc) (noting that no party suggested an alternative method for 
reviewing claim construction). 
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issue as simple as possible, requiring no complex distinction between law and fact. Furthermore, 
as the Lighting Ballast court argued, there must be a compelling reason to give up a practice that 
has been rooted for over fifteen years without issue. And as all parties tend to agree, changing the 
standard wouldn’t have much of a practical effect if any. Thus arises the question, why fix 
something that isn’t broken? While rejecting de novo review would clearly result in difficulty and 
confusion for the Federal Circuit in determining what is law and what is fact, it is not so clear that 
this concern is sufficient to uphold de novo review if it does in fact violate Rule 52.   
In fact, the same issue is present in other areas of the law – including patent law – that splits 
fact and law with relatively little issue. Most notably, opponents of de novo review look to the 
appellate review of issues of obviousness in the determination of validity of a patent. During an 
appellate review of a district court’s obviousness determination, the appellate court uses a two-
step analysis, separating the questions of law and fact, and reviewing them under their respective 
standards. In developing this process, the Federal Circuit noted that a determination of obviousness 
is a conclusion of law, subject to de novo review, although that conclusion is based upon 
underlying factual determinations, subject to Rule 52(a) – precisely what appears to be present 
during claim construction. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found that a district judge’s determination of whether a 
product was placed on sale under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is a mixed question of law and fact. In that 
case, “the ultimate determination…is a question of law, based on underlying facts. The Court 
reviews the ultimate determination de novo, but any subsidiary fact findings must be 
reviewed…for clear error.”110  
                                                 
110 Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1566, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1512, 1514-15 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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Accordingly, many tests have been suggested to separate legal and factual issues during claim 
construction. For example, it is often suggested that the test for obviousness determinations may 
be properly applied to claim constructions. Also, the Lighting Ballast dissent as well as the Phillips 
dissent put forth their own respective tests for separating law and fact. What proponents of de novo 
review argue, and what opponents do not deny, is that any attempt to separate law from fact would 
be a complication to an already complex issue. Where they differ however, is their opinion on 
whether the added complication is “worth the candle.”111  
In summary, proponents of de novo review correctly assert that any attempt to separate issues 
of law and fact in claim construction appeals will add complexity to an already complex issue. 
However, as the appellate review of obviousness and on-sale doctrine show, it is possible. And 
given the broad scope of Rule 52, it is probably necessary.  
V. The Federal Circuit’s Practice of De Novo Review Is In Accordance With the  
  Reasoning That Underlies Rule 52 
 
 While there has been much debate as to the proper standard of review of claim 
constructions, it is very possible that the debate is ultimately an academic one that will have no 
effect in practice. As shown above, the proper standard of review on appeal is likely a mix of de 
novo and clearly erroneous standards. If the Supreme Court does agree and rejects Cybor, how is 
the Federal Circuit to approach the issue going forward? Quite simply, not much should change.  
 As shown in Section II, the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of claim constructions is not 
nearly as strict as it appears to be on paper. On the contrary, many argue that there is “informal 
deference” being given to the district court’s findings of fact, which has only become more 
                                                 
111 See Teva Pharms USA, Inc., et al. v. Sandoz, Inc., et al., No. 13-854 (during oral argument, several justices 
questioned whether the difficulties associated with any new standard of review would be “worth the candle”). 
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common in recent years.112 And as the Lighting Ballast majority rightly asserted, this form of de 
novo review has been in place for over fifteen years without any serious problems.113 In contrast, 
any new rule for reviewing claim construction on appeal will likely yield confusion in its 
application going forward. 
 If the Supreme Court does reject de novo review, the Federal Circuit must keep in mind 
that it is not because de novo review has been resulting in erroneous decisions over the past 15 
years. On the contrary, any new standard of review would be put in place to substantiate the 
proposition that Rule 52 is a broad, “blanket” provision that should not have many exceptions.  
Therefore, an appellate judge should note the primary goal of Rule 52 – to give district courts 
deference when they are in the best position to make factual determinations, such as when they 
have sat through expert testimony. But as explained, the Federal Circuit already gives deference, 
or at least great consideration, to district judges in those situations. Given this deference, it is likely 
that the Federal Circuit’s current practice of de novo review implicitly satisfies Rule 52, while 
maintaining the Court’s ability to apply de novo review.  
 It is possible, and in fact likely, that the Supreme Court will require that issues of law and 
fact be separated, and this may result in a complex test. If the Federal Circuit then ignores its 
historical practice of informally deferring to district courts in favor of a new test, it will likely lead 
to confusion and erroneous decisions going forward. Therefore, the Court should think of any new 
test as simply formalizing its current practice. This may simply require that the Court outline its 
actual analytical process, i.e., giving a thorough review to district opinions, rather than simply 
stating that the issue is to be reviewed de novo.  
                                                 
112 See J. Jonas Anderson, Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of 
Patent Claim Construction, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. LAW. REV. (2013). 
113 See Lighting Ballast (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (looking to stare decisis to justify maintaining de novo review). 
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VI. Conclusion 
 The proper standard of review of claim construction has puzzled courts and academics for 
decades. For almost two decades, the Federal Circuit has used the de novo standard of review  
during claim construction appeals. But the Federal Circuit’s current practice of de novo review is  
probably improper because claim construction often requires subsidiary factual determinations that 
invoke the “clearly erroneous” standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Thus, the Supreme Court should 
overrule the Federal Circuit’s Cybor decision to comport with Rule 52. However, the Federal 
Circuit’s application of de novo review - in practice - appears to already give significant deference 
that is similar to the “clearly erroneous” standard of Rule 52. As such, the Federal Circuit should 
treat any new standard as an attempt by the Supreme Court to formalize the Federal Circuit’s 
practice of selectively deferring to district courts.  
